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COMMENTS 
RIGHT OF A SURVIVING PARTNER TO PURCHASE A DECEASED 
PARTNER'S INTEREST UNDER THE UNIFORM 
PARTNERSHIP ACT 
The rules of law applicable to the creation, continuance and termina-
tion of a partnership are established in forty-two states by the relevant 
provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act.1 The act provides that the death 
of a partner dissolves the partnership,2 whereupon the estate of the de-
ceased partner acquires a right to a payment on account of his interest in 
the partnership.3 The act is quite clear as to some aspects of this prob-
lem-for instance, the right of the surviving partners to possess firm prop-
erty4 and their right to wind up the partnership affairs.5 However, it is 
not so clear that the survivors, in the absence of agreement, invariably 
have a duty to liquidate the partnership as the sole means of satisfying the 
estate of the deceased partner. For the purposes of this discussion, the 
following hypothetical situation illustrates the problem: D and S formed 
a partnership which has been dissolved by the death of partner D. S, 
wishing to continue the business in which the partnership was engaged, 
desires to purchase D's interest and has offered a fair price therefor, but 
the legal representative of D's estate has refused the offer. Neither the 
partnership agreement nor D's will contains any provision dealing with the 
existing situation. The question presented is whether S may make a court-
sanctioned purchase of D's interest, or whether the legal representative of 
D will be able to force a liquidation sale of the partnership assets and 
thereby bring the enterprise to an end as a going concern. 
1 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -65 (1949); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-201 to 
-244 (1956); ARK. STAT. §§ 65-101 to -143 (1947); CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 15001-45; CoLO. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 104-1-1 to -43 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 34-39 to -81 (1961); DEL, 
CoDE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-43 (1953); GUAM CIV. CoDE §§ 2395-2472 (Supp. 1962); IDAHO 
CoDE ANN. §§ 53-301 to -343 (1957); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106½, §§ 1-43 (1961); IND. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 50-401 to -443 (1951); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 362.150-.360 (1962); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 
73A, §§ 1-43 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 108A, §§ 1-44 (1954); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 
449.1-.43 (1948); MINN. STAT. §§ 323.01-.43 (1961); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 358.010-.430 (1959); 
MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 63.101-.515 (1962); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67.301-.343 (1958); NEV, 
R.Ev. STAT. §§ 87.010-.430 (1959); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 42:1-1 to -43 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 66-1-1 to -43 (1960); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw §§ 1-74; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-31 to -73 
(1960); N.D. CENT. CooE §§ 45-05-01 to -09-15 (1960); Omo REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1775.01-.42 
(Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, §§ 201-244 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 68.010-.650 (1959); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1-105 (1930); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 7-12-12 to -55 (1956); s.c. 
CooE §§ 52-1 to -79 (1962); S.D. CODE §§ 49.0101-.0615 (1939); TENN. CooE ANN. §§ 61-101 
to -142 (1955); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6132b, §§ 1-45 (1962); UTAH CooE ANN. §§ 48-1-1 
to -40 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1121-1335 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to -43 
(1958); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 25.04.010-.430 (1955); w. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-8A-1 to -45 
(1961); WIS. STAT. §§ 123.01-.38 (1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-195 to -237 (1957). 
2 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(4) (1949) (hereinafter cited as U.P.A.). 
3 U.P.A. § 43. 
4 U.P.A. § 25(2)(d). 
5 U.P.A. § 37. 
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Of course, rights of the parties upon dissolution may be fixed by a 
partnership agreement, in which the parties are free to incorporate one of 
three of the more usual types of provisions: that the interest of a deceased 
partner shall be sold to the survivors; that the deceased partner's interest 
in the partnership shall continue, with the partnership business being 
perpetuated, for a given period of time; or that a partner's interest in the 
partnership shall exist only during his lifetime.6 Apart from such an 
agreed-upon provision, a few states have specifically adapted their probate 
laws to deal with the foregoing problem;7 the vast majority, however, 
leave the solution in such circumstances entirely to the operation of the 
Uniform Partnership Act. 
At common law the doctrine developed that, upon the dissolution of a 
partnership by the death of one of its members, a liquidation of the 
partnership assets was necessary to terminate the partnership business. 
Basically there were two reasons advanced for this rule. The first was to 
insure payment of the claims of partnership creditors; for if the old 
partnership was continued the danger existed that the creditors of the 
old partnership would be considered merely personal creditors of the 
surviving partners and not creditors of the new or continued partnership.8 
The second reason arose from the great disparity of knowledge between 
the surviving partners and the representative of the deceased partner as to 
the value of the partnership assets.9 Fear that the legal representatives of 
a deceased partner might be exposed to fraud and overreaching seemingly 
dictated a liquidation sale of the partnership assets as the best possible 
means of determining the value of the partnership. Although the prob-
lems concerning the payment of creditors of the old partnership have been 
specifically resolved by the Uniform Partnership Act,10 there still remains 
the possibility that fraud may be worked upon the estate of a deceased 
partner. This discussion is intended to demonstrate that, under the act, 
the likelihood of fraud should no longer be so controlling a factor as to 
require invariably a liquidation sale of partnership assets when a court of 
equity has within its supervisory powers the ability to protect fully all of 
the parties involved when a partnership is dissolved by death. 
It is widely appreciated that many businesses have value only as going 
concerns, and thus the immediate liquidation of partnership assets upon 
the death of a partner in many circumstances can only result in a serious 
reduction of the worth of such a partnership. Obviously, such a reduction 
a For discussion and evaluation of the various types of partnership agreement provi-
sions, see generally Fuller, Partnership Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise 
After the Death of a Partner, 50 YALE L.J. 202 (1940); Comment, 72 HARv. L. REv. 
1!102 (1959). 
7 Sec notes 64 & 65 infra. 
s However, a promise to pay such old creditors was often implied. See Lewis, The 
Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 634-36 (1915). 
o Annot., 1917C Ann. Cas. 946. See also note 28 infra. 
10 U.P.A. § 41. See generally text accompanying notes 35-37 infra. 
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affects the interests of the decedent's estate and the surviving partner in a 
like manner. In appropriate circumstances a reasonable alternative to 
liquidation is a court-sanctioned sale of the deceased partner's interest 
directly to the surviving partner or partners. With court supervision all 
the legitimate interests of a deceased partner's estate can be fully protected, 
while at the same time the surviving partners can achieve the equally rea-
sonable objective of safeguarding their own continuing interests. In order 
to substantiate the desirability and legitimacy of this alternative to liquida-
tion, a detailed consideration of the relevant sections of the Uniform Part-
nership Act is necessary. 
I. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Aar PROVISIONS 
A partnership is dissolved by the death of any of its partners.11 The 
act defines dissolution as "the change in the relation of the partners 
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as dis-
tinguished from the winding up of the business."12 The effect of dissolu-
tion is not to terminate the partnership; rather the partnership "continues 
until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed."13 As such, the 
terms "dissolution" and "termination," as employed by: the act, have 
different meanings. Dissolution does not completely extinguish authority 
of the surviving partner to deal with partnership property. As prescribed 
by the act, the order of events is: (I) dissolution, the point in time when the 
partners cease to carry on the business together; (2) winding up, the proc-
ess of settling partnership affairs after dissolution; and (3) termination, 
the point at which the partnership affairs have been entirely wound up.l4 
In the usual circumstances, "winding up" has been thought to refer to, 
and require, a liquidation of partnership assets, the payment of partner-
ship debts, and the distribution to the partners of the cash value of their 
partnership interests.15 However, at no place in the two sections referred 
to above, nor in the Commissioners' notes thereto, is the term "liquidation" 
found. And, as will be seen subsequently, when the act does deal with a 
liquidation situation, that term is used specifically. Thus, it must be con-
cluded that "winding up" was conceived as a term of art, encompassing 
the process of "liquidation," yet not necessarily requiring a liquidation 
sale in every instance. 
The single most significant section of the act concerning the proposed 
11 U.P.A. § 31(4). 
12 U.P.A. § 29. 
13 U.P.A. § 30, which provides: "On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, 
but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed." 
14 See U .P.A. § 29, Commissioners' Note, which states: "In this act dissolution desig-
nates the point in time when the partners cease to carry on the business together; 
termination is the point in time when all the partnership affairs are wound up; winding 
up, the process of settling partnership affairs after dissolution." 7 UNIFORM LAws AN-
NOTATED, Partnership, 165-6 (1949). 
15 CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 428-35 (2d ed. 1952). 
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survivor's purchase as an alternative to a liquidation sale is section 37. 
It provides as follows: 
"Right to Wind Up-Unless otherwise agreed the partners who 
have not wrongfully dissolved the partnership ... [have] the right 
to wi?Zd up the partnership affairs; provided, however, that any 
partner, his legal representative or his assignee, upon cause shown, 
may obtain winding up by the court."16 
In conjunction with sections 33,17 35(1),18 25(2)(d),19 38(1)20 and 4321 
of the act, section 37 confers upon a surviving partner expressly or im-
pliedly, an almost unqualified authority to wind up the partnership 
afiairs.22 Thus, the legal representative of a deceased partner cannot as 
such legally interfere in the ordinary "winding up" of the partnership 
affairs.23 In this relati.onship to the estate of the deceased partner for the 
purposes of winding up the partnership affairs, the surviving partner has 
been analogized by the courts to a trustee.24 While he is empowered to 
possess all of the partnership property for purposes of winding up, his 
power is limited to the performance of only those acts which are indis-
16 The omitted words arc: " ..• or the legal representative of the last surviving 
partner, not bankrupt, has ••.. " (Emphasis added.) 
17 "Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete 
transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority of any 
partner to act for the partnership •.•. " U.P.A. § 33. 
18 "(l) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership • • . (a) By any act 
appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing transactions unfinished at 
dissolution •••• " U.P.A. § 35(1). 
10 "On death of a partner his right in specific partnership property vests in the 
surviving partner or partners. . • • Such surviving partner or partners . . • [have] no 
right to possess the partnership property for any but a partnership purpose." U.P.A. 
§ 25(2)(d). 
20 "When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the partner-
ship agreement, each partner, as against his co-partners and all persons claiming through 
them in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may 
have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied 
to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners .... " U.P.A. § 38(1). 
21 "The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, ·or his legal 
representative, as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person 
or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any 
agreement to the contrary." U.P.A. § 43. 
22 Silberfcld v. Swiss Bank Corp., 273 App. Div. 686, 79 N.Y.S.2d 380, afj'd without 
opinion, 298 N.Y. 776, 83 N.E.2d 468 (1948). 
23 As to the possible conflict of this aspect of the U.P.A. with various state probate 
codes giving the executor of a deceased partner the right to administer partnership 
property, sec Comment, 22 WASH. L. REv. 35 (1947). The one court found to have been 
presented with this question in fact ruled that the probate provisions in conflict with the 
Uniform Partnership Act had been repealed by implication. Davis v. Hutchinson, 36 
F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1929) (concurring opinion). See also O'Connell, Need for Statutory 
Revision in Oregon, 23 ORE. L. REv. 93, 107 (1944). 
24 E.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Dennis, 256 App. Div. 495, 10 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1939), 
aff'd mem., 282 N.Y. 635, 25 N.E.2d 981 (1940); In re Johnson's Estate, 232 N.C. 59, 59 
S.E.2d 223 (1950); Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70, 79 A.2d 205 (1951). 
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pensable to that end.2r; How long the winding up may last and what acts 
of the survivor are compatible with that result necessarily vary with re-
spect to the type of business enterprise being concluded.26 By its terms, 
section 37 does give to the legal representative of a deceased partner 
the right to enforce a winding up sanctioned by a court, when "cause" for 
such action can be shown. This has been interpreted as allowing a court 
to appoint a receiver for the partnership assets when the surviving partner 
is either unable or unwilling to carry out the winding up process on his 
own behalf.27 A receiver's sale is then held in order to liquidate the part-
nership. 
Section 37 also allows "any partner" to obtain a court-controlled wind-
ing up "upon cause shown." Since the phrase "any partner" certainly in-
cludes surviving partners, S in our hypothetical situation should be en-
titled to such relief if he so desires and can show "cause." Various practical 
circumstances are considered as being sufficient to provide the requisite 
"cause" for a surviving partner to invoke this provision. For example, the 
complexities inherent in the process of accounting for interests in the 
partnership business have been considered "cause" within the foregoing 
definition, as has the fact that one of several surviving partners has ex-
ceeded his authority in the winding-up process. It is apparent, then, that 
in many cases it will be to the definite advantage of a surviving partner 
that a court have control of the winding up and liquidation process. 
Moreover, there appear to be other reasons why a surviving partner, 
though not wanting a liquidation of the partnership, should nevertheless 
find it both necessary and desirable for a court to control "winding up." 
An example would be our hypothetical situation, in which S desires to 
acquire dirrctly D's interest in the partnership. Since a "winding up" 
partner acts as a fiduciary in his relation to the estate of a deceased partner, 
he is forbidden, in such capacity, irrespective of the adequacy of the con-
sideration, to transfer partnership property to himself. Yet, were a court 
for any reason to assume control of a "winding up" and, in so doing, order 
a liquidation sale by a court-appointed receiver, the surviving partner 
·would no- longer stand in a fiduciary capacity and would be as free to 
purchase at such a sale as any third party. Thus, a feasible course of action 
for a surviving partner desiring to purchase the partnership assets would 
25 See, e.g., McKinley v. Long, 227 Ind. 639, 88 N.E.2d 382 (1949); Ewing v. Caldwell, 
243 N.C. 18, 89 S.E.2d 774 (1955); Wood v. Wood, 312 Pa. 374, 167 Atl. 600 (1933). 
26 See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 1391 (1957). 
27 Jay v. Clark, 85 Cal. App. 2d 88, 192 P.2d 462 (1948) (court also relying on CAL. 
PROB. ConE § 571). See also McKinley v. Long, 227 Ind. 639, 88 N.E.2d 382 (1949) 
(receiver appointed though not a decedent situation); ·wanderski v. Nowakowski, 331 
Mich. 202, 49 N.W.2d 139 (1951) (receiver appointed though not a decedent situation). 
Compare Orem v. Moore, 224 Ark. 146, 272 S."W.2d 60 (1954), where the court noted 
that the wisdom of allowing the surviving partner to wind up the business had not 
been sufficiently overridden by the legal representative's proof of the necessity for a 
receiver. See generally HIGH, RECEIVERS 523 (3d ed. 1894). 
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be to refuse to wind up the partnership affairs himself, thereby making it 
necessary for the representative of a deceased partner to initiate a section 
37 court-controlled winding up. 
A more direct approach by a surviving partner wishing to purchase a 
deceased partner's interest seems both logical and desirable. In short, might 
not S's desire to purchase the interest of D in the partnership assets be 
sufficient "cause" within the meaning of section 37 so as to vest control of 
"winding up" in a court on application by S? And since "winding up" 
does not necessarily refer solely to liquidation, should not a court proceed 
with that form of "winding up" which most adequately protects the in-
terests of all the parties? Under the rule at common law,28 to obviate any 
possibility of fraud or overreaching, the representatives of a deceased part-
ner were allowed to insist upon a liquidation of the partnership assets by 
sale, even though such action was not necessary for payment of partnership 
debts, and even though the proceeds would scarcely approximate the true 
value of the assets as a going concem.29 Yet, it is in this very set of circum-
stances, where a liquidation sale of the partnership assets at salvage value 
is the best price obtainable, that our hypothetical situation would most 
often arise. In such circumstances, if a court had control of the winding-
up process, a court-controlled accounting and a valuation of the deceased 
partner's interest ascertained as an incident thereto could provide a logical 
and equitable alternative to a liquidation sale, and could be allowed on 
application by the surviving partner. The survivor's payment of this 
amount, as the purchase price of the deceased partner's share, would inure 
to the benefit of all the parties, for such survivor should almost invariably 
be willing to pay more than a purchaser at a judicial sale, when in so doing 
he can avoid the potential losses occasioned by a liquidation and forced 
sale. Certainly the possibility of the deceased's representative being ex-
posed to fraud and overreaching should not dictate a liquidation sale when 
a court can so fully protect that interest and at the same time permit the 
surviving partner to accomplish a legitimate end. Yet, though much can be 
said in favor of such a judicially supervised "winding up," there is no 
authority sustaining its use under section 37. However, no cases have been 
found which would deny the validity of such a procedure.30 
Keeping in mind the proposed interpretation of section 37, it becomes 
necessary to look to other sections of the act which relate to dissolution 
and winding up of a partnership. Generally, it can be stated that a number 
:::8 CRANE, op. cit: supra note 15, at 459-67; LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIPS 568, 625 (12th ed. 
1962); 40 AM. JuR. Partnerships § 309 (1942); Annot., 1917C Ann. Cas. 948; 68 C.J.S. Part-
nerships § 285(b), at 785 (1950). Nor could he tortiously convert the personal property of 
the partnership and thereby become the owner. In re McCormick's Estate, 286 Ill. App. 
90, 2 N.E.2d 967 (1936). 
:m Sec, e.g., Bagg v. Osborn, 169 Minn. 126, 210 N.W. 862 (1926); Crawshay v. Collins, 
15 Ves. Jun. 218, 33 Eng. Rep. 736 (Ch. 1808); LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 568-69, 
625. 
30 See text at note 45 infra. 
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of these sections add force to the proposed interpretation of section 37, 
while the remainder do nothing to foreclose the possibility of utilizing 
such a procedure. The first important provision is section 38.31 Paragraph 
(1) of this section provides that when dissolution of a partnership is caused 
in any way, other than in contravention of the partnership agreement, 
"each partner, as against his co-partners and all persons claiming through 
them ... , unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property" 
applied to pay the firm debts and "the surplus applied to pay in cash the 
net amount owing to the respective partners." (Emphasis added.) Quite 
obviously omitted from the language of this section is any reference to the 
"legal representative" of a deceased partner, and, since that term is found 
extensively throughout other provisions of the act, its absence here must 
be presumed to have been intentional. Therefore, it appears that section 
38 gives "each partner," including a surviving partner, the right to require 
a liquidation of the partnership so as to satisfy its liabilities, and to have 
the balance distributed in cash. Section 38, by its terms, does not give this 
right to the legal representative of a deceased partner. Thus, section 38(1) 
raises no obstacles which would prevent a court from ordering such a sale 
and purchase as a means of "winding up" a dissolved partnership, when 
requested to do so by a surviving partner. 
Paragraph (2) of section 38, establishing the rights of the partners when 
the partnership has been dissolved in contravention of the partnership 
agreement,32 also lends support to the proposed interpretation of section 
37. Specifically, a liquidation sale of partnership assets is dispensed with 
when the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the partnership wish 
to continue the business. Provision is made for the purchase of the wrong-
doer's interest by the innocent partners.33 A bond may be required of the 
innocent partners by the court, but no method of valuation of the in-
terest to be purchased is established. Yet, the act seemingly contemplates 
that the court requiring the bond will closely scrutinize the transaction to 
insure fairness to all parties. Certainly, if a court in this setting is capable 
of ascertaining the interest of a partner in an existing partnership, it 
should be no more difficult for it to ascertain the value of a deceased 
partner's share. In sum, section 38(2) embodies a legislative recognition 
of the fact that liquidation may not be the most satisfactory means of 
81 U.P.A. § 38(1), quoted in note 20 supra. 
82 U.P.A. § 38(2), which provides: "When dissolution is caused in contravention of 
the partnership agreement the rights of the parties shall be as follows ••• (b) The part-
ners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if they all desire to continue the 
business in the same name, either by themselves or jointly with others, may do so, during 
the agreed term for the partnership and for that purpose may possess the partnership 
property, provided they secure the payment by bond approved by the court, or pay 
to any partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully, the value of his interest ••• , 
and in like manner indemnify him against all present or future partnership liabilities." 
33 See, e.g., Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 254 P.2d 919 (1954); Glazer v. 
Kurman, 384 Pa. 283, 120 A.2d 892 (1956). 
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"winding up" a wrongfully dissolved partnership in all situations. The 
proposed interpretation of section 37 extends no further than to recognize 
that a forced liquidation sale is not always the most satisfactory means of 
"winding up" a partnership dissolved by death. 
Section 41 of the act is entitled "Liability of Persons Continuing the 
Business in Certain Cases."34 It is concerned primarily with the rights of 
creditors of a partnership which, though dissolved, has been continued 
without liquidation.35 Of specific interest to the proposed interpretation of 
section 37 is the use of the term "liquidation" as it appears in paragraphs 
(1), (2) and (6) of section 41.86 In these paragraphs of the act it is pro-
vided that when a partnership is "liquidated" the proceeds are used to pay 
off creditors and then any excess is distributed among the partners so as to 
terminate the partnership. But if a partnership is not liquidated on dissolu-
tion, and should there be a sale of a partnership interest to remaining 
partners, creditors of the first partnership would be fully protected by the 
express language of sections 41(1) and (2).37 Thus, in our hypothetical 
situation, these same paragraphs would fully protect any creditors of the 
D and S partnership should S be permitted under section 37 to obtain a 
court-sanctioned purchase of D's interest. 
The next part of the act which is relevant to this discussion is section 
42,38 which deals both with the rights of a former partner to share in the 
34 U.P.A. § 41, which provides: "(l) When any new partner is admitted into an exist-
ing partnership or when any partner retires and assigns (or the representative of the 
deceased partner assigns) his rights in partnership property to two or more of the 
partners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more third persons, if the 
business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the first 
or dissolved partnership are also creditors of the partnership so continuing in business. 
"(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the representative of a deceased 
partner assigns) their rights in partnership property to the remaining partner, who 
continues the business without liquidation of partnership affairs, either alone or with 
others, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partner-
ship so continuing the business. 
"(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the dissolved partnership 
is continued as set forth in paragraphs (I) and (2) [i.e., without liquidation] of this sec-
tion, with the consent of the retired partners or the representative of the deceased part-
ner, but without any assignment of his right in partnership property, rights of creditors 
of the dissolved partnership and of the creditors of the person or partnership continuing 
the business shall be as if such assignment had been made .... " (Emphasis added.) 
85 See U.P.A. § 41, Commissioners' Note, which states: "This section as a whole deals 
primarily with the rights of creditors when a new partner is admitted or a partner 
retires, is expelled or dies, and the business is continued without liquidation of the 
debts of the partnership dissolved by the change in personnel.'' 7 UNIFORM LAws .AN-
NOTATED PARTNERSHIP 229 (1949). (Emphasis added.) 
80 See note 34 supra. 
87 Ibid. 
38 U.P.A. § 42, entitled "Rights of Retiring or Estate of Deceased Partner When 
the Business Is Continued,'' which provides: "When any partner retires or dies, and 
the business is continued under any of the conditions set forth in section 41(1, 2, 3, 
5, 6), or section 38(2)(b), without any settlement of accounts as between him or his 
estate and the person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, 
he or his legal representative as against such persons or partnership may have the 
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profits of a continued business and with his relationship to firm creditors. 
v\Then the business is continued after dissolution with his consent, a de-
ceased or retired partner is entitled to the value of his interest at the date 
of dissolution, plus, at his election, either the profits attributable to the 
use of his property or interest on that amount.30 The act does not specifi-
cally deal with such partner's rights absent his consent to continuance after 
dissolution.40 However, a majority of the courts interpreting this section 
have held that consent is not a requisite to an election under section 42.41 
Should the legal representative of a deceased partner seek to receive the 
value of the partner's interest at the time of dissolution, certainly a subse-
quent liquidation sale would be useless in ascertaining the amount of that 
interest. Thus, it has been held that a liquidation sale is not required 
under section 42 when there is a subsequent election to take the value at 
the time of dissolution. Rather, only an accounting is required, and the 
manner of payment may be worked out between the parties.42 
Only one case has been found in which a surviving partner sought 
judicial sanction for the purchase of a deceased partner's interest-Zach 
v. Schulman.43 However, the cause of action asserted in that case was based 
value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an 
ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partner-
ship with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal representative, in lieu 
of interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property of the 
dissolved partnership; provided that the creditors of the dissolved partnership as 
against the separate creditors, or the representative of the retired or deceased partner, 
shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as provided by section 
41(8) of this act." 
39 For cases awarding the value at the time of dissolution (death of one of the partners), 
see, e.g., Vanderplow v. Fredricks, 321 Mich. 483, 32 N.W.2d 718 (1948); M. & C. Creditors 
Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.) afj'd without opinion, 255 App. 
Div. 838, 7 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1938), afj'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E.2d 482 (1939); 
Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397, 170 Atl. 297 (1933); Mattson v. Wagstad, 188 Wis. 566, 206 
N.W. 865 (1926). See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 1084 (1948), on the construction and 
application of § 42. 
40 Only paragraphs 1, 2, & 3 of § 41, quoted in note 34 supra, deal with retiring 
or deceased partners, and under each consent to a continuation is required. 
41 See In re Streck's Estate, 35 Ill. App. 2d 473, 183 N.E.2d 26 (1962); M. & C. Creditors 
Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 255 App. 
Div. 838, 7 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1938), afj'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E.2d 482 (1939); 
Cahill v. Haff, 248 N.Y. 377, 380, 162 N.E. 288, 289 (1928); Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70, 
79 A.2d 205 (1951); Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 Atl. 276 (1925). Contra, Blut v. Katz, 
13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953). The majority interpretation follows the common-law 
doctrine -under which a former partner normally received profits or interest at his option 
whether the business had been continued with or without consent. E.g., Ruppe v. Utter, 
76 Cal. App. 19, 243 Pac. 715 (App. Dist. 1925) (no consent); Drapkin v. Klebanoff, 5 N.J. 
Misc. 531, 137 Atl. 432 (Ch. 1927) (no consent). This common-law rule was designed to 
prevent the unjust enrichment of the remaining partners. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 709 
(1954); 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1271 (1954). 
42 In re Shubert's Will, 1 App. Div. 2d 654, 146 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1955) (Per curiam), 
afj'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 914, 136 N.E.2d 913, 154 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1956) (Per curiam); M. & C. 
Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, supra note 41. 
43 213 Ark. 122, 210 S.W.2d 124 (1948). 
1963] COMMENTS 115 
on section 42. The administrators of the estate of the deceased partner had 
agreed with the surviving partner to continue the partnership hotel busi-
ness. After some operation the surviving partner sued to compel a sale to 
him of the deceased partner's interest at a value to be judicially determined. 
The administrators cross-claimed for a liquidation of the partnership and 
a distribution of the interest in the proceeds to them. Liquidation was 
granted and a judicial sale ordered. Evidently the surviving partner had 
proceeded on the theory that continuation of the partnership business 
conferred upon him the right to elect to purchase the interest of the de-
ceased partner. This contention was rejected by the court, which held that 
the language of section 42 related solely to the rights of a deceased partner's 
representative and conferred no rights upon the survivor.44 No fault can 
be found with such an interpretation of section 42. However, though the 
court did not mention section 37 of the act,45 it apparently assumed that 
the representatives had a right thereunder to demand liquidation. It does 
not appear to have been argued-nor did the court consider the matter 
-that section 37 conferred any applicable rights upon the surviving 
partner. Yet, the consequences of a liquidation in a situation such as that 
involved in the Zach case demonstrate the merits of a rule which would 
allow the survivor to purchase directly from the legal representative the 
interest of the deceased partner. It appears to be a well-settled rule that 
though a surviving partner, in his capacity as winding up partner, cannot 
sell the partnership assets to himself, he can nevertheless purchase such 
assets at a judicial liquidation sale.46 Thus, if either party, survivor or 
representative, commences a suit in equity to wind up the partnership, 
and a liquidation sale is ordered, there should be nothing to prohibit the 
survivor from purchasing at that sale.47 In effect, then, this court refused to 
allow the survivor to do directly what he could accomplish indirectly and 
possibly at a lower price. 
The final section of the act which relates to the problem of this dis-
cussion is section 43, entitled "Accrual of Actions."48 Section 43 vests in 
any partner, or his legal representative, the right to an account of his in-
terest, which right accrues against the winding-up partners at the date of 
dissolution of the partnership.49 Thus, upon the death of a partner the 
44 Zach v. Shulman, 213 Ark. 122, 127-29, 210 S.W.2d 124, 127-28 (1948). 
45 Sec text at note 16 supra. 
46 See Annot., 1917C Ann. Cas. 948; LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 625. 
47 James v. Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13 (1940); Galatis v. Plasman, 80 So. 2d 
918 (Fla. 1955); Murphy v. Murphy, 152 Kan. 810, 107 P.2d 700 (1940). See also McGee 
v. Russell's Ex'rs, 150 Va. 155, 142 S.E. 524 (1928). 
48 U.P.A. § 43, which provides: "The right to an account of his interest shall accrue 
to any partner, or his legal representative, as against the winding up partners or the 
surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of 
dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary." 
49 See Trecker v. Trecker, 334 Ill. App. 263, 78 N.E.2d 843 (1948)(mem.). See also 
Mattson v. Wagstad, 188 Wis. 566, 206 N.W. 865 (1926). It is not clear whether the duty 
to "account,'' as provided for in section 43, requires an actual payment or merely a 
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surviving partner is required to account to the deceased partner's represent-
ative for such partner's interest in the partnership business.CiO Yet, this 
section does not expressly compel a liquidation of the partnership assets 
in order to facilitate the accounting. Nor does it give the representative of 
the deceased partner the right to demand a liquidation; rather, the right 
given is for an accounting. 
In summary, a number of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing 
examination of the relevant sections of the Uniform Partnership Act in 
their relation to the proposed purchase of a deceased partner's interest by 
the surviving partner or partners. First, the problems presented under the 
common law as to the protection of creditors of a dissolved partnership 
have been dealt with specifically by section 41 and for all practical pur-
poses have been eliminated. Second, section 38(1) of the act gives the right 
to require a liquidation of a dissolved partnership only to "each partner" 
and not to the legal representative of a deceased partner. Third, "winding 
up," as that term is employed by sections 29 and 30, is a term of art, not 
necessarily requiring a liquidation sale in every instance. And fourth, 
section 37 permits a court to supervise the winding up of a dissolved 
partnership upon application showing sufficient "cause." Therefore, since 
"any partner" is given the right by section 37 to obtain a court-controlled 
"winding up," the only question presented is whether a surviving partner's 
desire to purchase the interest of a deceased partner for a fair price is 
sufficient "cause" to invoke court supervision within the meaning of the 
language of that section. It is submitted that "cause" is a relative concept, 
wholly dependent for its meaning upon the circumstances. As used in 
section 37, it should not be limited only to those situations demonstrating 
bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of one party. "Cause" should encom-
pass all situations in which a question of fairness to all the parties is in-
volved. As so interpreted, a surviving partner's application to a court for 
supervision of the "winding up" of a partnership dissolved by death, as 
demonstrating a willingness to purchase the deceased partner's interest at 
a judicially ascertained fair price, should be legally sufficient "cause" to 
invoke the aid of equity. 
II. EQUITABLE PowER ABSENT THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr 
The general common-law rule was that when the representative of the 
deceased partner and the surviving partners could not agree upon the divi-
sion of the property in kind or upon the price at which the deceased's in-
terest should be purchased for cash, all the assets of the partnership should 
be sold at a liquidation sale and the proceeds divided according to respec-
statement of the deceased partner's interest. It is clear, however, that section 43 does not 
compel a liquidation. 
!iO Long v. Mertz, 21 N.J. Super. 401, 91 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. 1952). 
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live interests of the partners.51 However, the following statement appears 
in Parsons, Partnership:52 
"It has sometimes been supposed that the surviving partners have a 
right to take all the effects and merchandise (after the debts are paid 
or secured) at a valuation. And, undoubtedly, there may be cases in 
which this would be a just and beneficial mode of settlement, and the 
court could therefore permit or order it. But it must be clear that they 
have no such right. Indeed, the right on this point is on the other 
side; for it would seem, both from the reason of the case and on the 
authorities, that the representatives of the deceased have a right to 
require a sale of the effects, as the only certain way of ascertaining 
their value and making a fair division. But this again, although a rule, 
cannot be deemed a universal rule; for equity may find in particular 
circumstances good reasons for not decreeing a sale, although it must 
be admitted that it strongly inclines to that mode of settlement, as, on 
the whole, the fairest and the saf est."63 
Of interest for the purposes of this discussion are those cases in which 
a court of equity has refused to order a liquidation sale after dissolution 
of the partnership even though the parties could not agree on a price for 
the former partner's interest. In an English case54 involving the dissolution 
of a partnership caused by the death of one of the partners, one of the 
partnership's principal assets was an unassignable contract. The court be-
low was directed to value the contract, and to find an account of all the 
partnership assets and effects. The survivor was then charged with the 
deceased's share so determined. The method of handling dissolution adopted 
there was dictated by considerations of expediency; yet, it is clear that the 
court could and did protect all parties. An American court was faced with 
a similar problem in Colgate's Ex'r v. Colgate.55 After a partner's death 
had dissolved the partnership, the court found that it would be more 
advantageous to all the parties to order a direct sale of the decedent's in-
terest to the surviving partners. It was noted that the survivors would be 
willing to give full value for the interest in order to avoid liquidation of 
the partnership, whereas a purchaser at a judicial sale might offer less due 
!il See 40 AM. JuR. Partnership § 306 (1942) where the rule is stated: "The surviving 
partners cannot require the personal representatives of the deceased partner to accept 
a share in the partnership property at a mere estimated value, but on request must ascer-
tain the value of the firm property by the usual method of selling it." See, e.g., Sigourney 
v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11 (1828); Johnson v. Mantz, 69 Iowa 710, 27 N.W. 467 (1886); Bagg 
v. Osborn, 169 Minn. 126, 210 N.W. 862 (1926); Gathright v. Fulton, 122 Va. 17, 94 S.E. 
191 (1917). 
li2 PARSONS, PARTNERSHIP (4th ed. 1893). 
li3 Id. § 348, at 441-43 (Emphasis added.) For cases supporting this statement, see 
Didlake v. Roden Grocery Co., 160 Ala. 484, 49 So. 384 (1909); Valentine v. Wysor, 123 Ind. 
47, 23 N.E. 1076 (1889); Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. Jun. 218, 33 Eng. Rep. 736 (Ch. 1808). 
54 Ambler v. Bolton, 14 Eq. 427 (1872). 
li5 23 N.J. Eq. 372 (1873). 
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to possible defects in title.56 It should be noted, however, that in neither 
of these two cases does the record indicate that the legal representative of 
the deceased partner's estate objected to the sale of the interests to the 
surviving partners. 
Analogous to the above-mentioned situations are cases permitting the 
~urviving partner to purchase the partnership assets at a judicial sale.r.7 
The concern of the court in James v. Wade58 is illustrative. After the death 
of a partner, the surviving partners filed a bill in equity asking for the 
appointment of a receiver to wind up the partnership business. At the 
receiver's sale which eventuated, the surviving partners were the purchasers. 
The representative of the deceased partner contested the validity of the 
sale. In affirming the procedure, the court said: 
"We know of no procedure whereby the surviving partners could 
have proceeded where all interests would have been protected as well 
as in the chancery court .... 
"This was not a sale by one of the partners, but was a sale by an 
officer of the court, and the chancery court seems to have exercised the 
utmost caution to protect the interests of all the parties."159 
Thus, once a court is convinced that the rights of the deceased's estate 
will be fully protected, the procedure of sale to the survivor would appear 
to be satisfactory.Go 
In another area of partnership dissolution, that involving retiring 
partners or partners wrongfully causing dissolution, some courts have 
recognized that there are instances in which a liquidation sale of the 
partnership assets is not fair to all the parties concerned. For the purposes 
of this discussion, the case of Gelphman v. Gelphman61 is of the most im-
portance. The plaintiff in that case was a partner who had retired because 
of illness. After the partnership business had been continued for a time, the 
plaintiff sued for an accounting, dissolution of the partnership, and such 
other relief as would be proper, but did not specifically request a liquida-
tion and attendant sale. Defendants, the remaining partners, cross-claimed, 
asking that plaintiff be required to convey all his interest in the partnership 
to them. The reviewing court affirmed an order that the plaintiff execute 
and deliver a deed to defendants of his interest in the partnership real 
estate. In overruling the plaintiff's contention that a liquidation should 
have been ordered, the court said: 
56 Id. at 383. 
57 See cases cited in note 47 supra. 
58 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13 (1940). 
159 Id. at 792, 141 S.W.2d at 15. 
60 See also McGee v. Russell's Ex'rs, 150 Va. 155, 164, 142 S.E. 524, 527 (1928), holding 
that a receiver's sale to a surviving partner would not be set aside, as the purchase price 
paid by the surviving partner was the best evidence of the value of the partnership assets. 
61 142 Kan. 582, 50 P .2d 933 (1935). 
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"Had appellant's present objection been made at the trial, the court 
might have ordered the sale of the property, but it was not obliged to 
do so. It was competent for the court, sitting as a court of equity, to 
adjudge the disposition of the partnership property, to order convey-
ances of partnership property a'nd to make division of partnership 
assets."62 
The court thus appeared to rest its decision on alternative grounds, i.e., 
that plaintiff had not asked for a liquidation sale, and, even if he had, that 
a court of equity would not be obliged to order a liquidation sale of 
partnership property upon dissolution, but could instead order a convey-
ance. The case is important for its disclosure of a favorable judicial attitude 
toward the inherent power of a court of equity to act in such a manner.63 
However, though equity has at times forced retiring or wrongdoing part-
ners to sell their interests to the remaining partners, no case has been 
found in which a court of equity ordered a deceased partner's representa-
tive to sell his partnership interest directly to the surviving partners. The 
desire to protect the estate of the deceased partner from fraud and over-
reaching by the surviving partners has apparently been of sufficient magni-
tude to bar the giving of such relief. 
III. SPECIFIC STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The states of Ohio64 and Washington65 have enacted specific legislation 
enabling a surviving partner or partners of a partnership dissolved by 
62 Id. at 588, 50 P.2d at 936. (Emphasis added.) 
63 See generally Ludlam, Dissolution of Partnerships by Death, 23, Miss. L.J. 117 
(1952). Other cases of interest arc Turken v. Olshanski, 237 Mich. 623, 212 N.W. 961 
(1927); Dow v. Beals, 149 Misc. 631, 268 N.Y. Supp. 425 (Surr. Ct. 1933). Compare the sale 
of a wrongful partner's interest under the U.P.A. § 38(2)(b). 
64 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.04 (Page Supp. 1962), which provides: "With the 
approval of the probate court by which the executor or administrator for the estate of 
a deceased partner was appointed, the surviving partners may take the interest of such 
deceased partner in the partnership assets, at the appraised value of such interest after 
the debts and liabilities of the partnership are deducted from such partnership assets, 
upon giving to the executor or administrator their promissory notes, with good and 
approved security, in payment for the interest of the deceased partner in the partner-
ship assets. Such notes shall be payable with interest, in not more than nine months from 
the time the surviving partners elect to take such assets. Such election must be made 
within thirty days from the date of the approval of the inventory and appraisement by 
such court." 
65 WASH. REv. CODE§ 11.64.030 (1956), which provides: "The surviving partner or the 
surviving partners jointly, shall have the right at any time to petition the court to purchase 
the interests of a deceased partner in the partnership. Upon such petition being presented 
the court shall, in such manner as it sees fit, learn and by order fix the value of the 
interest of the deceased over and above all partnership debts and obligations, and the 
terms and conditions upon which the surviving partner or partners may purchase, and 
thereafter the surviving partner or partners shall have the preference right for such 
length of time as the court may fix, to purchase the interest of the deceased partner at the 
price and upon the terms and conditions fixed by the court. If any such surviving partner 
be also executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased partner, such fact shall not 
affect his right to purchase, or to join with the other surviving partners to purchase such 
interest in the manner hereinbefore provided." 
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death to elect to purchase the interests of a deceased partner. No agreement 
in the partnership articles is necessary to obtain the benefit of these 
statutes. Nor is the consent of the legal representative of the deceased 
partner required.66 In each state the surviving partners need only petition 
the appropriate court to inform it of their desire to purchase the deceased's 
interest,67 whereupon the appraisement of the deceased partner's interest 
is placed in full control of the court.68 Under both statutory schemes the 
surviving partners are required to make full disclosure of partnership in-
ventory, assets and liabilities.69 After notice, and a hearing on the valuation 
of the deceased's interest,70 the debts and liabilities of the partnership are 
deducted from the value of its appraised assets to determine the propor-
tionate interests of the partners.71 Judicial confirmation of the purchase is 
required for the full protection of the deceased partner's estate. As the 
Washington court has said, the statutory procedure has two primary pur-
poses. First, it grants a preference right to the surviving partner to purchase 
the deceased partner's interest; and second, it places a duty upon the court 
to ascertain the value of the deceased partner's interest and establish the 
terms of the sale.72 
The Ohio legislation allows the surviving partners to give their secured 
notes for the purchase price, payable not more than nine months from the 
date the surviving partners elect to purchase.73 The Washington statute 
permits the court to fix the terms, conditions and time of the purchase.74 
Both statutory enactments also require that a bond (Ohio;75 Washington, 
"may be" required if it appears necessary to the court76) be given by the 
surviving partners to the legal representative of the deceased partner to in-
66 The Ohio legislature in 1957 amended its original statute, which had required the 
consent of the deceased's executor or administrator to such purchase. The requirement of 
consent by the executor was thought not to be consistent with the substantive rights of 
the surviving partner to purchase at the appraised value. The language requiring such 
consent was thus deleted from the statutory provisions. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.04 
(Page Supp. 1962); Sater, Recent Amendments Affecting Probate Practice, 18 Omo 
ST. L.J. 464, 468 (1957). 
67 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE § ll.64.030 
(1956). Moreover, even where the surviving partner is also the executor or administrator of 
the deceased partner, his right under these statutes is not affected thereby. This jg true 
in Washington by virtue of specific statutory language. WASH. REv. CODE§ 11.64.030 (1956). 
By decision the Ohio statute has been interpreted to reach the same result. See Rammels-
berg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875). 
68 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE §§ ll.64.002, 
.030 (1956). 
69 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE §§ ll.64.002, 
.022 (1956). 
70 OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE § ll.64.030 
(1956). 
11 Ibid. 
72 In re Giant's Estate, 57 Wash. 2d 309, 356 P.2d 707 (1960). 
73 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1778.04 (Page Supp. 1962). 
74 WASH. REV. CODE§ ll.64.030 (1956). 
75 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.05 (Page Supp. 1962). 
10 WASH. REv. CoDE § 11.64.016 (1956). 
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sure the payment of all partnership debts and the performance of all partner-
ship contracts.77 Finally, it is specifically provided in the Ohio statute,78 and 
necessarily implied thoughout the Washington legislation, that the legal 
representative must deliver to the surviving partners an assignment of the 
interest of the deceased partner in the partnership assets and cause a cer-
tificate of transfer of title to issue as to partnership real estate. Since the 
statutory provisions discussed above are quite explicit in outlining the pro-
cedure to be followed, relatively little litigation has arisen concerning their 
use. It is clear, however, that the statutory procedure must be explicitly 
complied with if the option to purchase is intended to be exercised.79 
Of comparative interest to this discussion is a North Carolina statuteso 
which embodies essentially the same basic procedures as do the Ohio and 
'Washington provisions. However, the North Carolina statute requires not 
only the approval of the court, but also the "consent of the executor or 
administrator" of the deceased partner before a surviving partner may 
purchase his interest. (Emphasis added.) In effect, this statutory provision 
recognizes the considerations of policy motivating the Ohio and Washington 
legislation; yet, it places a potentially insurmountable obstacle in the 
path of the privilege otherwise granted. It might well be argued that the 
requirement of the executor's consent is inconsistent with the survivor's 
supposed statutory right to purchase. Moreover, rather than curtailing the 
strict common-law rule as to sales between surviving partners and represent-
atives of deceased partners, this legislation introduces the additional re-
quirement of judicial confirmation before such a sale can be consummated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When a partnership is dissolved by the death of one of the partners, 
three interests arise which the law should endeavor to protect. The first is 
the interest of the creditors of the dissolved partnership. In states which 
have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, such interests are fully protected 
by its section 41. The two remaining interests are those of the surviving 
partners and those of the estate of the deceased partner. As between these 
two interests, the common law developed doctrines designed primarily to 
77 Ibid.; Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.05 (Page Supp. 1962). 
78 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.05 (Page Supp. 1962). 
70 Weitz v. Weitz, 15 Ohio App. 134 (1921). 
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-81 (1960), which, in part, provides: " ... (b) Surviving Partner 
May Purchase.-The surviving partner may, with the consent of the executor or ad-
ministrator of the deceased partner and the approval of the clerk of the superior court 
by whom such executor or administrator was appointed, purchase the interest of such 
deceased partner in the partnership assets at the appraised value thereof, including the 
good will of the business, first deducting therefrom the debts and liabilities of the partner-
ship, for cash or upon giving to the executor or administrator his promissory note or notes, 
with good approved security, and satisfactory to the executor or administrator, for the 
payment of the interest of such deceased partner in the partnership assets.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
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safeguard the latter. Absent an express agreement between the partners, 
very little consideration was given to the protection of the survivor's con-
tinuing interest. This discussion has attempted to demonstrate that the 
possibility of fraud being worked upon the estate of a deceased partner 
should no longer be controlling when a court has within its supervisory 
powers the ability to fully protect all the interests arising from a partner-
ship dissolution caused by death. The specific statutory provisions of Ohio 
and Washington indicate that at least several legislatures have acknowl-
edged this fact. Yet, a result similar to that provided for in those statutes 
appears to be readily available under section 37 of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act itself. To read "winding up" as invariably necessitating a liquida-
tion upon a dissolution caused by death of a partner is to misconstrue the 
language of section 37. "Winding up" is a term of art; it was conceived as 
such and should be so interpreted. Thus, a court should be able to proceed 
under section 37 with that form of "winding up" which most adequately 
protects the interests of all the parties in the particular situation before it. 
In many instances, then, a judicially supervised sale of a deceased partner's 
interest to the surviving partners would conceivably constitute that form 
of "winding up." By reading into section 37 the common-law power of the 
representative of a deceased partner to compel liquidation, the represent-
ative is in effect given an uncontrolled option either to proceed under 
section 42 (to recover the value of the deceased partner's interest at the 
time of dissolution plus either interest or profits) or to force a liquidation. 
This latter alternative has awesome potential as a bargaining weapon in 
any negotiations between the representative and the surviving partners re-
lating to the continuation of the business. It is indeed questionable 
whether the fortuitous occurrence of death should occasion such a result. 
Rather, section 42 alone seems to protect fully all legitimate interests of a 
deceased partner's estate, and the common-law power to force a liquidation 
of the partnership assets is no longer necessary to insure a fair valuation 
of the deceased partner's share. It is widely recognized that any well-
considered partnership agreement takes into account the effect of the 
death of any of the partners. The vast majority of such agreements there-
fore include some provision negating the supposed necessity, at common 
law, of liquidation upon dissolution of the partnership. It seems inherently 
reasonable that the uniform law of partnership, applicable in the absence 
of a specific agreement, should be interpreted to conform with what most 
partners would desire had they considered the problem. By interpreting 
section 37 to allow a surviving partner, on application to a competent 
court, to purchase a deceased partner's interest at fair value and after a 
fair appraisal, this result could best be effectuated. 
Charles R. Frederickson 
